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Abstract 
 
The real output deterioration, high fiscal deficits and increased sovereign debt burden 
represents key phenomena that affected the maneuverability of fiscal authorities in the early 
crisis years. Controversy between fiscal sustainability and fiscally driven economic recovery 
fueled a large number of academic and policy discussions about the appropriate response of 
governments to the crisis challenges. Empirical literature provides mixed evidence about the 
effects of fiscal policy adjustments on the macroeconomic performance. Moreover, pro-
cyclical patterns in fiscal policies of many countries during the pre-crisis period did not reveal 
clear lessons learned that would be beneficial for fiscal authorities during the crisis years. 
In the paper we examine effects of the fiscal policy shocks in CE3 (the Slovak Republic, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary) within different stages of the business cycle by employing 
threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) model. We calculate fiscal multipliers and 
generalized impulse-response functions to assess the responsiveness of the real output to the 
fiscal policy adjustments. The main objective is to determine whether effects of the fiscal 
policy shocks differ during expansion and recession. Our results indicate that the size of fiscal 
multipliers and responsiveness of the real output are generally higher for spending fiscal 
shocks while effects of revenue fiscal shocks are much less dynamic in all three countries. 
Moreover, results differs between upper (expansion) and lower (recession) regime as well as 
for the per-crisis and crisis periods. 
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Introduction 
European Union member countries experienced a decrease in the macroeconomic 
performance during the early stages of the economic and debt crisis. Significant deterioration 
in the fiscal stance as one of the primary implications of the economic recession revealed 
questions associated with fiscal sustainability in terms of threshold levels of fiscal deficit and 
sovereign debt that individual countries can sustain over longer period of time (Wöhlbier, 
Astarita and Mourre, 2014). Fiscal implications of the economic crisis varied across European 
Union member countries considering existing differences in the financial discipline of fiscal 
authorities (levels of fiscal budget balance and sovereign debt), overall macroeconomic 
performance and high level of heterogeneity of individual markets that altogether affects the 
overall costs of fiscal consolidation (European Commission, 2012). On the other hand, both 
theoretical and empirical literature provides robust evidence on benefits of fiscal incentives 
based on adjustments on expenditure, revenue or both sides of the government budget that 
stimulates economies during the bad times (Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Müller, 2010). 
However, structural patterns of crises related external shocks, large interconnection and 
interdependence among countries as well as oversized sovereign debt burden reduced 
maneuverability for fiscal stimuli and shrunk countercyclical framework for national fiscal 
policies (Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh, 2011; Farkašovský, Lawson and Zimková, 2015). As a 
result, disputable implications of fiscal incentives remained contrary to the crucial need of the 
effective fiscal consolidation that was necessary to reduce excessive fiscal deficits and high 
sovereign debts. Finally, governments focused on the reduction of public expenditures and 
increase in taxes during the periods of lagging recession and thus cooled down economies 
(Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2003). However, an appropriate composition of fiscal 
incentives without direct negative effect on the public budget and its revenue and expenditure 
sides may help to reduce negative budgetary pressures through increased tax capacity of the 
economy followed by stronger growth of the real output. 
The overall success of the large fiscal adjustments (following either the idea of fiscal 
consolidation or fiscal stimuli) may differ across individual countries (due to i.e. direct and 
spillover effects of quantitative easing, effects of internal and external (in countries outside 
the Euro Area) devaluation, reforms of fiscal institutions, etc.) (Barrios, Langedijk and Penc, 
2010). Elimination of significant adjustments in the primary fiscal balance is the most 
convenient way to reduce a negative impact of fiscal policy on economic growth (Perotti, 
2005). While significant improvements in the primary fiscal balance during the fiscal 
contraction (i.e. fiscal consolidation) may be followed by economic growth slowdown 
(Mountford and Uhlig, 2008), significant deteriorations in the primary fiscal balance during 
the fiscal expansion (i.e. fiscal stimuli) increases sovereign debt burden that may induce a 
subsequent recession after reaching the threshold level (Cournède and Gonand, 2006). 
Moreover, according to the empirical literature, effects of fiscal adjustments clearly differ in 
good times and bad times (Fernandez and Hernandez de Cos, 2006; Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen 
and Wolff, 2006). As a result, the size of fiscal multipliers is changing in the different stages 
of the business cycle (Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo and Nodari, 2015; Ramey and 
Zubairy, 2014). 
In the paper we examine effects of the fiscal policy shocks in CE3 (the Slovak 
Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary) within different stages of the business cycle. The 
main objective is to determine whether effects of the fiscal policy shocks differ in “good” and 
“bad” economic times, i.e. during expansion and recession. Moreover, we calculate the size of 
fiscal multipliers at CE3 countries. The analyzed period starts at the peak of economic 
transition of those countries in 1995 and 1996 and ends in 2015. Our research idea is based on 
the assumption that key implications of fiscal adjustments are generally sensitive to the recent 
stage of the business cycle and thus affect the responsiveness of real output to the changes in 
government revenues and expenditures (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009). We employ threshold 
VAR methodology pioneered by Tsay (Tsay, 1998). Before the estimation of non-linear 
TVAR model, the non-linearity test has to be conducted in order to detect threshold non-
linearity in time series. While the parameters of each regime are estimated by simple OLS, the 
non-linearity results from the transitions between regimes and therefore traditional impulse 
response functions cannot be used to analyze effects of fiscal policy shocks. Instead, we use 
the concept of generalized impulse response functions (Koop et al., 1996). Moreover, we 
calculate fiscal multipliers and examine effects of economic crisis on their size. To provide 
more rigorous insight into the impact of crisis on effects of fiscal policy we evaluate the 
policy effects separately in pre-crisis and crisis period. We assume that a comparison of the 
results for different time period is essential to understand the changes of fiscal policy effects 
on economic activity. 
While the effects of fiscal policy shocks in the new EU member countries is well 
documented in the recent empirical literature (i.e. Borys, Ciżkowicz and Rzońca (2013); 
Cauresma, Eller and Mehrotra, (2011), Filipovski, Fiti and Trenovski (2016); Boiciuc (2016); 
Dumitrescu (2015); Ćorić, Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić (2015); Franta (2012); Petrevski, 
Bogoev and Tevdovski (2015)), diversity in methodology, sample size as well as observed 
period results in mixed evidence about the size of fiscal multipliers, the real output 
responsiveness to the fiscal adjustments and, as a result, counter-cyclical and/or pro-cyclical 
patterns in the fiscal policy. Estimated threshold VAR model in our paper for CE3 countries 
revealed fundamentally new information about the effects of fiscal policy shocks. Our results 
indicate that the size of fiscal multipliers and responsiveness of the real output are generally 
higher for spending fiscal shocks while the effects of the revenue fiscal shocks are much less 
dynamic in all three countries. Moreover, while the effects of the fiscal spending shocks are 
more dynamic during recession in the Czech Republic and Hungary, fiscal spending 
multipliers in the Slovak Republic are generally high during the recession as well though 
higher during expansion. While the fiscal revenue shocks have generally negligible effect on 
the output over the increasing horizon in all three countries, the distribution of the size of 
fiscal revenue multipliers between both regimes is similar in all three countries (larger in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary during recession while larger in the Slovak Republic during 
expansion). 
Following the introduction, we provide an overview of current empirical evidence 
about effects of fiscal policy shocks. Wide range of causal implications of spending and 
revenue based fiscal adjustments as well as their size and durability is well documented in 
papers published during the last two decades. Section 2 provides an overview of the threshold 
VAR methodology considering two regimes, identification of fiscal policy shocks and 
calculation of generalized impulse-response functions and fiscal multipliers. Analysis of 
effects of the fiscal policy shocks in CE3 countries (section 3) examines responsiveness of 
real output to the 1% and 5% spending and revenue based fiscal shocks. Finally, section 4 
provides concluding remarks. 
 
1. Overview of literature 
Effects of fiscal policy shocks are well documented especially on the sample of 
developed countries. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employed mixed structural VAR/event 
study approach to identify the automatic responses of taxes and government spending to 
economic activity. They also argued that positive government spending shocks have a positive 
effect on output, while positive tax shocks have a negative effect on output. The multipliers 
for both spending and tax shocks are typically small. 
Perotti (2005) implemented SVAR approach to analyze the effect of fiscal policy on 
output, prices and interest rates in five OECD countries. The results can be summarized as 
follows: 1) The effects of fiscal policy on output and its components have become 
substantially weaker in the last 20 years; 2) The tax multipliers tend to be negative but small; 
3) Once plausible values of the price elasticity of governments spending are imposed, the 
negative effects of government spending on prices that have been frequently estimated 
become positive, although usually small and not always significant; 4) Government spending 
shocks have significant effects on the real short-term interest rate, but uncertain signs; 5) Net 
tax shocks have very small effects on prices; 6) The U.S. is an outlier in many dimensions; 
U.S. responses to fiscal shocks are often not representative of the average OECD country 
included in this sample. 
Giuliodori and Beetsma (2004) also implemented few identifications schemes using 
VAR methodology to analyze the (spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in European 
economies. Their analysis is focused on the indirect channel of transmitting the fiscal policy 
shocks that affect an import of the country. They also emphasized a necessity of enhanced 
fiscal coordination at the macroeconomic level.  
Romer and Romer (2007) analyze the causes and consequences in the level of taxation 
in the postwar U.S. Their results indicate that tax changes have very large effects on output. 
At the same time output effects are very persistent. Authors argue it is due to the strong 
response of investments to the tax burden decrease. 
Caldara and Camps (2008) provide empirical evidence on the response of key 
macroeconomic variables to government spending and tax revenue shocks for the U.S. over 
the period 1955-2006. Authors implemented four approaches (the recursive approach, the 
Blanchard-Perotti approach, the sign-restrictions approach and the event-study approach) to 
identify their system based on the VAR methodology. While there is the empirical evidence 
that the positive responses of private consumption and the real wage are very persistent, 
authors argued that the most current-generation DSGE models consistent with an increase in 
these variables predict that the responses turn negative already about one year after the 
government spending shock occurs. They also find strongly diverging results as regards the 
effects of tax shocks depending on the identification approach used, with the estimated effects 
of unanticipated tax increases ranging from non-distortionary to strongly distortionary. 
Baum et al. (2012) examined effects of fiscal policy shocks on output in Germany 
within linear VAR and non-linear TVAR model. They showed that the state of the business 
cycle matters and that the fiscal multipliers are higher at the times of downturn than in 
expansion. The latter study builds on the first and estimate fiscal multipliers of G7 economies 
(excluding Italy). Presented results are qualitatively similar to previous study. Both works 
followed identification scheme proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Another closely 
related study based on TVAR approach where authors estimated the impact of fiscal policy is 
work of Batini et al. (2012) for the United States, Europe and Japan or Hernández de Cos et 
al. (2013) for Spain. Author showed that the resulted fiscal multipliers during the recession 
exceed fiscal multipliers in expansion. A slightly different approach used Ferraresi et al. 
(2014) who employed TVAR to assess how the fiscal policy effects differ depending on state 
of the credit markets. Or the work of Afonso et al. (2011), where authors investigated how the 
stress in financial markets affect fiscal policy in United States, United Kingdom, Germany 
and Italy. Benčík (2014) used modified version of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) 
smooth transition VAR model to calculate regime fiscal multipliers for recession and 
expansion in V4 countries.  
 
2. Threshold VAR Methodology 
VAR models represent dynamic systems of equations in which the current level of 
each variable depends on past movements of that variable and all other variables involved in 
the system. Residuals of vector tu  represent unexplained movements in variables (effects of 
exogenous shocks hitting the model); however as complex functions of structural shocks 
effects they have no economic interpretation. Structural shocks can be still recovered using 
transformation of the true form representation into the reduced-form by imposing a number of 
identifying restrictions. Applied restrictions should reflect some general assumptions about 
the underlying structure of the economy and they are obviously derived from economic 
theory. There are two general (most used) approaches to identify VAR models. (I) Cholesky 
decomposition of innovations implies the contemporaneous interactions between exogenous 
shocks and the endogenous variables are characterized by a Wald causal chain. Ordering of 
endogenous variables then reflects expected particular economy structure following general 
economic theory assumptions. However, the lack of reasonable guidance for appropriate 
ordering led to the development of more sophisticated and flexible identification methods - 
(II) structural VAR (SVAR) models. Identifying restrictions implemented in SVAR models 
reflect theoretical assumptions about the economy structure more precisely. 
Our paper is based on the work of Baum et al. (2011) and Baum et al. (2012). The 
former study examines the effects of fiscal policy shocks on output in Germany within linear 
VAR and non-linear TVAR (threshold vector autoregression) model. Two-regime TVAR 
model with threshold variable tz  and delay d  can be defined as follows 
 
[ ] [ ] tdttdttt uzIYLDzzIYLDY ++≤= −−−− *12*11 z>)()(    (1) 
where Ttttt GDPGTY ),,(=  is a vector of endogenous variables (government revenues, 
government spending and real output) and ),,( GDPt
G
t
T
tt uuuu =  is the vector of reduced form 
residuals. Subsequently [ ].I  represents an indicator function that equals 1 if the condition 
holds and 0 otherwise. The threshold value *z  together with the lag polynomial matrices 
1( )D L  and 2( )D L  (including deterministic constant) have to be estimated.  
Threshold variable tz  determines the prevailing regime of the system where lag 
polynomial matrix can vary. We set the threshold delay parameter d  to 1 as is common in 
related studies3 (Baum, 2011; Batini, 2012). TVAR model with two regimes appears to be the 
most appropriate option because it best fits the character of the business cycles - it clearly 
distinguishes between positive and negative output gap. Moreover the choice of only two 
regimes is suitable due to the low number of available observations. 
Before we proceed to estimation of TVAR model, the non-linearity test has to be 
conducted to find out whether the threshold-type non-linearity in the time series is present. 
We use Tsay non-linearity test as in Tsay (1998) and set trimming percentage to 28%4. Non-
linearity test results are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Non-Linearity Test Results 
  test statistics (p-value) 
Czech Republic 18.7132 (0.095688) 
Slovak Republic 25.5812 (0.012297) 
Hungary 22.2979 (0.034313) 
 
Source: Author's calculations. 
 
The test results reject hypothesis of linearity at the 5% level in case of the Slovak 
Republic and Hungary but only at the 10% level in case of the Czech Republic. 
If the Tsay test indicates the presence of the non-linearity in the system, the estimation 
of TVAR model can be carried out. Each regime consists of observations, which were 
assigned to regimes according to threshold variable and selected threshold value *z . Within 
each regime, the coefficients are estimated by OLS. Thus the TVAR model is linear in the 
parameters in each regime but the switches from one regime to another regime are responsible 
for the non-linearity. The choice of the threshold value *z  can be randomly selected (though it 
needs to be empirically verified) (in the case of output gap as threshold variable, we assume 
the threshold value is equal to 0 that enables us to clearly identify the periods of expansion 
and recession) or it is possible to apply conditional least squares estimation and select the 
model minimizing the residual sum of squares (Tsay, 1998). 
                                                     
3 The prevailing regime is determined by the threshold variable in previous period. If the threshold variable 
z  at time 1−t  exceeds the threshold value *z  the variables are determined by parameters of upper regime and 
vice versa. 
4 As Tsay recommends we conducted a test with a various trimming values, we rejected H0 at least at the 
10% significance level. 
Compared to traditional VAR models, TVAR model requires higher number of 
observations due to independent estimation procedures of parameters in distinct regimes. 
Commonly used annual data are not in many cases sufficiently large therefore the drawback 
of this method is that it requires higher frequency data. Alternatively, we could use smooth 
transition VAR model for estimation of fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions. 
Whereas the dynamics of the variables in TVAR approach is modeled by the limited number 
of states, the dynamics in smooth transition VAR is modeled by the continuum of states. 
Therefore both approaches suit our needs but due to relative simplicity we choose TVAR 
approach as our baseline model. 
 
2.1 Identification Scheme 
A common problem of reduced-form residuals is the correlation. It follows that the 
variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form residuals is not equal identity matrix. Hence, the 
shock in one variable affects another variable at the same time. Following Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) we assume that the reduced-form residuals are linear combinations of 
(structural) tax, government spending and output shocks. More specifically fiscal reduced-
form residuals respond to unexpected structural fiscal policy shocks and automatic response 
to output shocks is included as well. Output reduced-form residuals also respond to 
unexpected fiscal policy shocks together with structural shocks in output. These relationships 
are captured in the following equations: 
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where ),,( GDPt
G
t
T
tt εεεε =  represents the vector of structural shocks. Above mentioned 
relations between the reduced-form residuals tu  and the structural shocks tε  can be also 
rewritten to the matrix notation: 
tt BAu ε=       (3) 
 
Similarly to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the determination of parameters is carried 
out within three steps. In the first step the parameters 1a  and 1b  have to be determined. We 
assume the parameters 1a  and 1b  represent the automatic effect of output to fiscal variables on 
the one hand and the discretionary reaction of fiscal policy to changes in output on the other. 
Here the usage of quarterly data plays a key role as it is general truth the legislative process of 
democratic institutions takes a long time. Therefore the adoption of appropriate fiscal policy 
measure as a reaction to the unexpected output shocks takes more than one quarter what 
makes a second effect irrelevant. Consequently the parameters capture only the elasticity of 
net taxes and government spending to output. Unlike the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) we 
decided to calibrate the parameter 1a  of surveyed countries. Our decision about the selection 
of parameter 1a  is based on the work of Eller (2009), who estimated the elasticity of 
government revenues for the Slovak Republic (0.88), the Czech Republic (0.99) and Hungary 
(1.02). Only slightly different values of 1a  have been applied in the VAR literature based on 
the Blanchard and Perotti identification scheme. For example, Pécsyová (2013) derived the 
elasticity of government revenues for the Slovak Republic at 0.76 or Valenta (2011) assumed 
9.01 =a  for the Czech Republic. It is assumed the components of government spending are 
not sensitive to changes in output, hence we set the elasticity of government spending 
according to the changes in output, coefficient 1b , to 0. The size of 1b  is also compatible with 
the calculated coefficients of elasticity of government spending in Eller (2009), which are 
close to 0 for all three countries. 
The second step comprises of estimation of parameters 1c  and 2c . Given the 
parameters 1a  and 1b  we can calculate cyclically adjusted (CA) tax residuals as 
1
CA T T GDP
t t tu u a u= −  and cyclically adjusted spending residuals as 1
CA G G GDP G
t t t tu u b u u= − = (it 
results from the fact that 1 0b = ). Cyclically adjusted residuals are not correlated with 
GDP
tε  
consequently they serve as instruments in the third equation in (2). 
Within the estimation of parameters 2a  and 2b it is necessary to determine the 
character of fiscal policy. Specifically the decision whether government spending reacts to 
changes in taxes ( 02 =a , 02 ≠b ) or taxes react to changes in government spending ( 02 ≠a , 
02 =b ) should be taken. Since it is difficult to find arguments that justify first or second 
ordering we performed OLS estimation between CA Ttu  and 
CA G
tu  with both orderings
5. The 
results are not affected by the type of ordering6. 
Given the relationship between reduced-form residuals and the structural shocks we 
rewrite the original TVAR model accordingly as 
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where )()( 1 LCALD ii
−=  and tt BAu ε
1−= . We assume the shocks tε  are independent and 
identically distributed with covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. A  describes the 
contemporaneous relation among the variables in the vector tY .  
Without proper identification scheme shocks do not have economic interpretation. 
Once the shocks are identified we can calculate generalized impulse response functions and 
individual fiscal multipliers. Since many authors calculate fiscal multipliers in their studies, 
correct definition of fiscal multiplier is crucial assumption to preserve comparability between 
those studies. Fiscal multiplier can be defined as the ratio of change in output ( y∆ ) to change 
in fiscal variable represented by government spending ( )g∆  or taxes ( )t−∆ . Following 
                                                     
5 The results presented in the next section are based on second ordering. 
6 Upon changed ordering the estimated coefficients were statistically insignificant that is why the size of 
fiscal multipliers was not altered. 
Spilimbergo et al. (2009) several types of fiscal multipliers can be distinguished, depending 
on the time horizon. The impact multiplier defined as 
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measures the immediate reaction of output to change in fiscal variable. Subsequently 
cumulative multiplier 
∑
∑
=
+
=
+
∆
∆
N
j
jt
N
j
jt
g
y
0
0       (6) 
 
is considered as the most appropriate measure among those mentioned in Spilimbergo et al. 
(2009). It captures the cumulative reaction of output to cumulative change in fiscal variable at 
some specific horizon N .  
From identified TVAR models we compute generalized impulse-response functions 
and fiscal multipliers to estimate effects of fiscal policy shocks (1% and 5% shocks in 
government spending and government revenue) on real output in both regimes (lower regime 
- recession gap, upper regime  - inflation gap). Effects of the crisis period is also examined by 
splitting the whole period (1995/1996 - 2015) into the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
Our sample includes three small and open economies from the region of the Central 
Europe (CE) that is why Poland is excluded from our sample. As Spilimbergo et al. (2009) 
suggest, the fiscal multipliers in small and open economies tend to be smaller than in large or 
medium sized countries. They assume the size of the government spending multiplier for 
small and open economies is lower than 0.5 and revenue multiplier is lower than 0.25. 
 
2.2 Generalized Impulse Response Function 
Impulse response functions in non-linear TVAR model cannot be easily generated 
from the model parameters as in linear VAR models. To assess the dynamics of the model for 
which Wold representation does not exist, another method must be applied. Therefore we 
follow the approach of Koop et al. (1996) and generate generalized impulse response 
functions (GIRF), which allows us to evaluate effects of fiscal shocks in TVAR model. Due to 
non-linearity of TVAR model the reaction of variables to exogenous shock depends on the 
size and the sign of the shocks hitting the economy and the history of variables. The reaction 
of variables in TVAR models (unlike to traditional linear VAR models) to positive shock and 
the opposite reaction in case of negative shock need not be symmetric about the x-axis. The 
same is true for the size of the shock (within non-linear TVAR model a shock of size 2% does 
not have exactly twice the effect of a shock of size 1%). As a result of large shock the 
economy can move between the regimes differently in given periods than in the case of 
smaller shocks, hence it is essential to assess the effects of different shock size. Formally the 
GIRF can be defined as 
 
[ ] [ ]1111 ,0,,0,0,0,,0, −+++−+++ Ω===−Ω=== tmtttmttmtttmt YEYEGIRF εεεεεε   (7) 
 
where mtY +  is vector of variables at time mt +  and 1−Ωt  represents a history. It follows that 
GIRF is difference between the forecasted path of variable in an economy without shock and 
forecasted path of the same variable in an economy hit by a shock. Numerical simulations are 
essential to generate GIRFs. Detailed algorithm is available in Baum et al (2011) or Ferraresi 
et al (2014) or in Appendix A. We conducted our TVAR analysis using the statistical software 
R. 
During numerical simulations occurs the question of generating output gap after each 
forecasted period. Following the approach of Baum et al (2012) potential output calculated 
using the HP filter remains constant within the forecasted horizon and is not affected by 
shocks. As authors point out, changes in potential output are expected to occur predominantly 
in the long-run and changes within 6 forecasted periods are meaningless. Given the potential 
output we can simulate the evolution of endogenous variables and calculate the output gap in 
combination with forecasted path of output variable. In order to calculate GIRFs for every 
history, we prolonged potential output at the end of the sample.  
 
2.3 Data 
We perform estimation of TVAR model on quarterly data of the Slovak Republic, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. The data are based on ESA 2010 combined with ESA 95. Both 
the data source and the character of mentioned economies cause the data on quarterly basis 
are fully available since 1999. Some data are available from 1995. 
Government revenues are defined as total revenues less transfers, subsidies and 
interest payments and we refer to them as net taxes. Net taxes are calculated as: indirect taxes 
+ direct taxes + capital taxes + social contributions + capital transfers receivable + other 
current transfers receivable - social benefits - other current transfers payable - capital transfers 
payable - subsidies. Other current revenue receivable, capital transfers receivable, other 
transfers payable, capital transfers payable are not available since 1995Q1 to 1998Q4 on 
quarterly basis. However, the data are available on annual basis, therefore we proceed to 
interpolation and in some cases (gross fixed capital formation available before 1999 in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary) the data were obtained by keeping the same share as in 1999. 
Also we did not include capital transfers into calculation of net taxes (similarly as in Baum 
(2012)) for Czech Republic due to many outliers in those series. As a government expenditure 
indicator we used government consumption expenditure together with government gross fixed 
capital formation. Specifically the structure of government expenditures and net taxes is 
similar to Borg (2014), who based the estimation of fiscal multipliers on ESA 95 and used 
same identification scheme. All variables are deflated with the output (GDP) deflator and 
seasonally adjusted using X-13 ARIMA-SEATS developed by the United States Census 
Bureau. 
In related literature authors employ mainly two measures of economic activity, serving 
as threshold variable - output gap and output growth rate. In our study we will present and 
discuss the results based on output gap. We estimated output gap with the use of Hodrick-
Prescott filter ( 1600=λ ) on the real output time series. Output gap enters the model in the 
percentage of potential output.  
 
Table 2 ADF Test Results 
  
Number of lags (t-statistics, p-value) 
T G output output gap 
Czech Republic 3 (-3.75302, 0.0050) 0 (-10.85474, 0.0001) 1 (-5.59009, 0.0000) 4 (-3.65595, 0.0067) 
Slovak Republic 0 (-10.9084, 0.0001) 3 (-4.47900, 0.0005) 0 (-11.55891, 0.0001) 0 (-4.35061, 0.0007) 
Hungary 3 (-5.33113, 0.0000) 0 (-6.79142, 0.0000) 0 (-4.47576, 0.0005) 1 (-3.79207, 0.0044) 
 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
We estimated TVAR model using variables in the first differences but firstly we 
applied logarithm to non-stationary series. We test whether the variables follow a random 
walk with drift for which we used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test where the number of 
lags was chosen according to Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The ADF test indicates 
that all differenced series are stationary, so we can reject the null hypothesis of unit root. The 
threshold variable is also assumed to be stationary. Results of ADF tests are summarized in 
Table 2.  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 The decision on the number of lags in TVAR model was based on standard 
information criteria. According to Akaike information criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn (HQ) 
and Schwarz information criterion (SIC) the optimal lag length for all three countries is 1. 
However the issue of selecting the optimal lag length is slightly more complicated in non-
linear framework. Since we have the limited amount of observations for each country the 
selection of one lag seems to be the most appropriate alternative. Table 1 summarizes the 
main information concerning the data and results of estimation. 
 
Table 3 TVAR Estimation 
 sample 
lag 
length 
threshold 
value 
(estimated) 
number of observation in 
recession - expansion regime 
Czech Republic 1996Q1 - 2015Q1 1 1.09316 52 - 24 
Slovak Republic 1995Q2 - 2015Q3 1 -0.51883 45 - 36 
Hungary 1995Q2 - 2015Q3 1 0.25374 55 - 26 
 
Source: Author's calculations 
Our results from estimated TVAR model for CE3 countries indicate that the 
distribution of all observations mostly prevail in the lower regime while the number of 
observations in upper regime is still sufficient to preserve the robustness of the results that 
reveal the effects of fiscal policy shocks in both recession and expansion regimes. Moreover, 
higher representation of observations in the regime of recession7 indicates that countries 
operated during the most of the analyzed period below the potential real output. As result, the 
higher importance of the fiscal policy shocks and their effect on the real output in the lower 
regime should be considered in the concluding remarks. 
 
3.1 Impulse-Response Functions 
In the following figures (Figure 1, 2 and 3) we summarize the responses of fiscal 
variables and particularly output to 1 percentage positive government spending and revenue 
shocks in observed economies.  
 
Figure 1 GIRFs for 1% Shock in Government Spending and Net Taxes - SR 
 
 
Note: Curves represent responses (changes in percentage) of real output to the positive fiscal shocks in each 
individual country from the EU3 group. All shocks are standardized to one-percent shocks. Horizontal axis 
depict quarters. 
Source: Author's calculations 
                                                     
7 Occurrence of the negative output gap represented 68% of all observations in the Czech Republic, 55 
percent in the Slovak Republic and 68 percent in Hungary. 
Figure 2 GIRFs for 1% Shock in Government Spending and Net Taxes - CZ 
 
 
Note: Curves represent responses (changes in percentage) of real output to the positive fiscal shocks in each 
individual country from the EU3 group. All shocks are standardized to one-percent shocks. Horizontal axis 
depict quarters. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Figure 3 GIRFs for 1% Shock in Government Spending and Net Taxes - HU 
 
 
Note: Curves represent responses (changes in percentage) of real output to the positive fiscal shocks in each 
individual country from the EU3 group. All shocks are standardized to one-percent shocks. Horizontal axis 
depict quarters. 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
Cumulative response of output due to the government spending shock in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary tends to be higher in a recession than expansion during the whole 
forecasted period. Differences within regimes reach considerable proportions and in case of 
the Czech Republic cumulative response of output tends to be even negative in upper regime. 
Similar results in both countries are valid for responses of output to the revenue shock, i.e. 
higher revenue multipliers in recession. The response of output to positive revenue shock is 
negative in Hungary in both regimes. In case of the Czech Republic the impact revenue 
multiplier is 0.97 within both regimes regardless of the shock size. However, the cumulative 
revenue multiplier declines sharply and at horizon of 4 and 6 quarters its size is close to zero 
or even negative in upper regime. TVAR model estimated on the Slovak data indicates that 
fiscal stimuli (government spending shocks) were more effective in terms of the size of fiscal 
multipliers in the regime of expansion. 
The positive government expenditure shock (increase in government expenditures) 
was followed by an increase in the real output in the lower regime in all three countries. As a 
result, the fiscal expansion in bad times (recession) provides beneficial incentives and boosts 
the real output in the whole group. Despite some minor differences among individual 
countries our results correspond with empirical evidence. Spending multipliers differed 
between regimes and reached higher values in the Slovak Republic in comparison with the 
previous two countries. However, the responsiveness of the real output to the government 
spending shock in the upper regime revealed some differences that need to be explained 
(Ramey and Zubairy, 2014; Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Végh, 2011). It seems that fiscal expansion 
in good times (upper regime) provides mixed evidence about the effects of fiscal stimuli in 
economies operating above the potential product (Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen and Wolff, 2006). 
The real output in the Slovak Republic increased even more after the positive government 
spending shock (in comparison with a lower regime), an increase of the real output in 
Hungary was just negligible while the real output in the Czech Republic temporarily 
decreased. Revealed mixed evidence about the role of fiscal stimuli in CE3 countries in the 
upper regime indicates questionable and even country specific implications of expansionary 
expenditure based fiscal redistribution (Tsibouris, Horton, Flanagan and Maliszewski, 2006). 
According to some authors, fiscal expansion may increase productive capacity of the country 
that is why positive effects of expenditure policies may be significant even in good times 
(Ramey and Zubairy, 2014). While the size of fiscal multipliers at this stage strongly depend 
on the structure of government expenditures (Ćorić, Šimović and Deskar-Škrbić, 2015), the 
risks of induced inflationary pressures in the country at the peak of its performance (Petrevski, 
Bogoev and Tevdovski, 2015) may easily turn into the overheating of the economy followed 
by an inevitable cool-down and thus a significant reduction in the multiplication process. As a 
result, pro-cyclical patterns in the fiscal policies conducted via increase in the public 
expenditures in good times reduce the real output growth rates in Hungary and even 
deteriorates the real output in the Czech Republic. Finally, the Slovak Republic is the only 
example in our sample of countries where the fiscal expansion conducted in the upper regime 
stimulates the real output growth rates though it may induce an unfavorable crowding-out 
effect and/or an increase in the current account deficit in the long run (Giuliodori and 
Beetsma, 2004). 
Our results also indicate that the overall vulnerability of the real output to an increase 
in the taxes was generally small and short-term. Moreover, differences in the revenue 
multipliers between regimes were also small and close to zero after one year. We suggest that 
reduced countercyclical effects (upper regime) of the revenue based fiscal policy indicate 
reduced maneuverability of fiscal authority to reduce the risk of overheating in good times via 
taxing. While generally surprising (Romer and Romer, 2007), these results even emphasize 
increased role of external sector in determining the overall performance of the small opened 
economies in our sample. On the other hand, reduced and short-term negative responsiveness 
of the real output to the revenue based fiscal shocks (increase in taxes) in CE3 countries 
(lower regime) represents good signal for fiscal authorities consolidating public finance. This 
observation corresponds to empirical evidence in some countries (Wöhlbier, Astarita and 
Mourre, 2014) though due to risks associated with deepening the recession during the bad 
times this type of policy is generally not recommended. 
To check the robustness of results we also performed certain modification. We fixed 
the threshold value to 0 and re-estimated TVAR model for all three countries. This implies 
that the assignment of certain observation into lower or upper regime is determined by the 
output gap in the previous quarter. If the economy is in positive output gap in the previous 
quarter then the observation in current quarter will be assigned to upper regime and vice 
versa. The resulted redistribution of observations changed only slightly for all three countries 
(HU - 49 observations in lower regime and 32 in upper regime; SK - 53 in lower regime and 
28 in upper regime; CZ - 45 in lower regime and 31 in upper regime)  compared with an 
estimate by minimization of residual sum of squares. However, the generated impulse 
responses were not significantly affected by this modification and the size of fiscal multipliers 
remained generally unchanged. 
Since we see certain risk in data interpolation we decided to analyze qualitative results 
of our paper without observations before 1999Q1. Reduced number of observations may 
cause biased estimates but the fact remains that the fiscal multipliers in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary are higher in recession, while in Slovakia fiscal multipliers are higher in 
expansion. 
 
Figure 4 Cumulative Response of Output before and during the Economic Crisis 
 
 
Note: Curves represent responses (changes in percentage) of real output to the positive fiscal shocks in each 
individual country from the EU3 group. All shocks are standardized to one-percent shocks. Horizontal axis 
depict quarters. 
Source: Author's calculations 
Simulation of generalized impulse responses for each quarter enables us to estimate 
the fiscal multipliers for specific sub-periods. In order to examine the effects of the crisis 
period on estimated responsiveness of the real output to the fiscal variables generated impulse 
responses were divided into two consecutive periods 1995Q2-2007Q4 and 2008Q1-2015Q3 
(1996Q2-2007Q1 and 2008Q1-2015Q1 for the Czech Republic). Average GIRF were then 
computed for each given period and regime. Figure 4 captures the cumulative reaction of 
output to a 1 percentage shock to government spending and net taxes for two different 
periods. Different impulse responses are not the result of change in parameters (the estimated 
parameters remain unchanged) the algorithm simply takes into account the different starting 
conditions during generating impulse responses. 
Crisis period moderately affected responses of output and the size of fiscal multipliers 
(see Appendix B). In two countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary) the period after the 
crisis is characterized by reduced fiscal multipliers compared to the period before the crisis. 
On the other hand, the response of the Slovak output to fiscal shocks tends to be higher in 
period after 2007Q4. The largest differences between spending multipliers in different periods 
occurred in the Czech Republic where, in some periods, the differences in the size of fiscal 
multiplier exceeded 0.15 percentage points. 
 
Estimated cumulative impulse-response functions are converted to fiscal multipliers 
using the country's sample mean of output-spending (output-revenues) ratio. Fiscal multipliers 
are summarized in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Cumulative Fiscal Multipliers 
Slovak Republic 
4 quarters 6 quarters 
1% (5%) 
spending shock 
1% (5%) 
revenue shock 
1% (5%) 
spending shock 
1% (5%) 
revenue shock 
Lower regime 0.60 (0.65) 0.01 (0.02) 0.52 (0.56) 0.02 (0.02) 
Upper regime 0.72 (0.78) 0.10 (0.09) 0.63 (0.68) 0.09 (0.08) 
Hungary 
4 quarters 6 quarters 
1% (5%) 
spending shock 
1% (5%) 
revenue shock 
1% (5%) 
spending shock 
1% (5%) 
revenue shock 
Lower regime 0.58 (0.58) 0.24 (0.24) 0.52 (0.51) 0.20 (0.19) 
Upper regime 0.10 (0.08) 0.05 (0.02) 0.06 (0.05) 0.02 (-0.01) 
Czech Republic 
4 quarters 6 quarters 
1% (5%) 
spending shock 
1% (5%) 
revenue shock 
1% (5%) 
spending shock 
1% (5%) 
revenue shock 
Lower regime 0.33 (0.31) 0.06 (0.08) 0.28 (0.27) 0.06 (0.07) 
Upper regime -0.32 (-0.34) -0.15 (-0.12) -0.23 (-0.22) -0.11 (-0.09) 
 
Source: Author's calculations 
 
With increasing size of the shock from 1% to 5% only small changes in estimated 
fiscal multipliers occurred. The most significant differences are mainly the result of higher 
spending shocks in the Slovak Republic while spending and revenue multipliers in case of 
Hungary remained almost unchanged. Following our results we may conclude that the size of 
the shock does not represent a significant determinant of fiscal multipliers in our sample of 
the countries. Furthermore we analyzed the differences in response of the output due to the 
type of the shock, i.e. whether it is positive or negative. However the effect of negative 1 
percentage shock to government spending and revenues seems to be similar as the same shock 
with positive sign. The differences were even smaller in comparison with the previous 
analysis concerning the shock size (because of lack of space the detailed results of negative 
shock effects are not reported). 
 
Conclusions 
In the paper we have analyzed effects of the fiscal policy shocks in CE3 countries by 
employing TVAR model. Our results indicate that the overall responsiveness of the real 
output to the fiscal adjustments as well as the size of fiscal multipliers generally corresponds 
to the recent findings in the empirical literature. However, estimated model that enabled us to 
examine effects of the changes in government expenditures and taxes during good times 
(upper regime) and bad times (lower regime) revealed crucial implications of fiscal 
adjustments according to the phase of the business cycle in our sample our countries. 
Responsiveness of the real output to the expenditure based fiscal shocks was generally 
higher (though different) in all three countries. Differences became even more significant 
when comparing the results for both regimes. While in the recession (lower regime) the real 
output increased after the positive government spending shock (the most significantly in the 
Slovak Republic and the most durable in Hungary), results for the expansion (higher regime) 
revealed mixed evidence. As a result, pro-cycle patterns of the expenditure based fiscal 
expansion in the good times reduced the real output growth rates in Hungary and even 
deteriorated the real output in the Czech Republic. Contrary, fiscal expansion in good times 
was followed by an increased dynamic in the real output growth rates in the Slovak Republic. 
It seems that the fiscal expansion in the Slovak Republic in good times might have the 
positive effect on the productive capacities, however, risks of inflationary pressures, 
crowding-out effect and current account deficit still makes pro-cyclical patterns in the 
expenditure based fiscal adjustments in good times less favorable. 
Surprisingly, responsiveness of the real output to the revenue based fiscal shocks was 
small and of a short-term durability in all CE3 countries. Our estimates indicate reduced 
benefits of countercyclical fiscal adjustments in good times, negligible deteriorating effects on 
the real output favor revenue based consolidating adjustments in bad times. While generally 
disputable, these results correspond to both theoretical (Friedman, 1957) and empirical 
(Wöhlbier, Astarita and Mourre, 2014) evidence in the small opened economies. Moreover, 
vulnerability of the real output to the changes in the different tax rates in both regimes will be 
investigated in our further research. 
Finally, splitting the whole examined period into two sub-periods revealed interesting 
implications of the crisis period on the estimated results. Differences in the responsiveness of 
the real output are slightly higher in case of the expenditure based fiscal adjustments in all 
three countries (in terms of both, regimes and sub-periods). In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary our estimates confirmed reduced role of fiscal authorities in determining the real 
output dynamics during the crisis years as indicated by both impulse-response analysis as well 
as the size of fiscal multipliers. However, the Slovak experience from period-based approach 
confirmed regime based differences in comparison with remaining two economies. This 
finding corresponds with economic crisis intensified demand driven redistributive (or 
expenditure shifting) effects (Mirdala, 2015). As a result, the crisis period reduced the role of 
public expenditures in the real output determination in the Czech Republic and with a less 
intensity in Hungary while in the Slovak Republic the role of public spending increased and 
even induced an increase in the productive capacity. 
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Appendix A: Algorithm for computing GIRF 
 
1. Pick a history rt 1−Ω , where Rr ,,2,1 = . The history represents the actual value of the 
lagged endogenous variable at a date r . Note that R  refers to the values 
corresponding to the regime the impulse responses are calculated for. 
2. Draw the residuals * mt+ε  with replacement from the estimated residuals tε  of TVAR 
model. 
3. Given drawn residuals, rt 1−Ω and model parameters 1D  and 2D , simulate the evolution 
of jtY + , mj ,,1,0 = . We yield )(
*
1 mt
r
tmtY +−+ Ω ε . 
4. If we want to shock i th variable add a shock 0ε  on i th element of the firstly drawn 
residual.  
5. Given drawn residuals * mt+ε  modified by shock 0ε , 1−Ωt and model parameters 1D  and 
2D , simulate the evolution of jtY + , mj ,,1,0 = . We yield ),(
*
01 mt
r
tmtY +−+ Ω εε . 
6. Repeat steps 2 to 5 B  times ( 400=B ). 
7. Calculate differences between shocked and non-shocked path. Subsequently take the 
average of computed differences. 
8. Repeat steps 1 to 7 for all histories. 
9. Compute the average GIRF as 
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Appendix B: Fiscal Multipliers before and during Crisis Period 
 
Slovak Republic 
4 quarters 6 quarters 
before 2007 
(after 2007) spending 
shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) 
revenue shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) 
spending shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) revenue 
shock 
Lower regime 0.55 (0.65) 0.00 (0.05) 0.47 (0.58) 0.01 (0.04) 
Upper regime 0.66 (0.75) 0.06 (0.08) 0.57 (0.68) 0.05 (0.07) 
Hungary 
4 quarters 6 quarters 
before 2007 
(after 2007) spending 
shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) 
revenue shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) 
spending shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) revenue 
shock 
Lower regime 0.59 (0.52) 0.25 (0.21) 0.55 (0.40) 0.22 (0.15) 
Upper regime 0.10 (0.07) 0.05 (-0.02) 0.07 (0.02) -0.02 (0.05) 
Czech Republic 
4 quarters 6 quarters 
before 2007 
(after 2007) spending 
shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) 
revenue shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) 
spending shock 
before 2007 
(after 2007) revenue 
shock 
Lower regime 0.37 (0.24) 0.10 (0.03) 0.35 (0.18) 0.09 (0.02) 
Upper regime -0.28 (-0.43) -0.15 (-0.19) -0.21 (-0.27) -0.10 (-0.14) 
 
